The adoption of positioning technologies to supplement, complement and function as defense intelligence applications has become widely accepted within homeland security and military circles. At the core of advancement are four main positioning technologies. Specifically these are the global positioning system (GPS), second generation (2G) and beyond mobile telephone networks (including wireless data networks), radio-frequency identification (RFID) and geographic information systems (GIS). For all positioning technologies, both separately and when combined, it is of primary importance to their continued adoption that the controlling powers have an in-depth understanding of the causality between implementation, usage and flow-on effect. This relies on an alignment of defense strategy, knowledge systems, security requirements and citizen rights within the broader social context. Whereas this social context must respond to continuing security breaches, advancements in technology, and the ever-changing face of bureaucracy there is however, great difficulty in creating an uncompromising foundation for homeland security which is at all times both void of complexity and suitable to all. Even more difficult though is to predict both the events and consequences which will herald from the systems now being created.
INTRODUCTION
Through a path of development and commercialization, systems integration and convergence, the use of positioning technologies in defense has become an accepted, if not standard, feature of intelligence applications. Explored in Realized Applications of Positioning Technologies in Defense Intelligence (the precursor to this chapter), four main positioning technologies are identified as being at the core of advancement. These are the global positioning system (GPS), second generation (2G) and beyond mobile telephone networks (including wireless data networks), radio-frequency identification (RFID) and geographic information systems (GIS). Alone, each technology presents a unique aid during responsive and preventative defense scenarios-ranging from warfare through to the dissemination of information-but when used together their force and reach are multiplied.
The control and command of this power is paramount as we note that, continuing into the 21 st century, our global society is faced with an uncertain and wholly dynamic security environment. In addition to known geographic and cross-border aggressions, the hidden threats of terrorism and the complexities of information warfare also seem to be increasing. The result is that world governments now more than ever need to actively understand and monitor the environments in which they and their citizens participate.
Where positioning technologies play a significant role in this environment, a context of use needs to be created whereby defense strategies are appropriate and security requirements are accordingly aligned.
Written to supplement the previous investigation of realized applications, this chapter is an exploration of the future evolutionary path of positioning technologies in defense intelligence. It seeks to provide insight into how positioning technologies could be used to prevent and respond to a breach in security, and will analyze these types of implementations from within a social context. Current awareness of positioning technology applications will then be used as the foundation for a predictive analysis of future trends, culminating in a final assessment of advancement.
PREDICTED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS
While entirely hypothetical, a predictive investigation of positioning technology usage points to possible defense intelligence approaches using current technology. The applications are not spelled out as 'this' or 'that' application but rather follow a conjoining theme throughout. The predictive scenarios attempt to cover pre and post a breach in homeland security, from preventing a threat, to managing, responding and recovering from an attack. Thus they consider what is traditionally known as 'contingency planning' through to 'emergency management and response'.
Preventative Scenario
The preventative approach proactively seeks ways to stop a potential terrorist attack or breach in security by using all the relevant information available to form intelligence about an event that has yet to occur. It is like bringing pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together to form a picture; only here almost certainly a large number of pieces are missing and the final picture to be represented is ambiguous. Intelligence is not merely about certainties, as indeed questions will always be raised over even the clearest of intercepted data that shows how an adversary will strike. Increasingly, intelligence is about pulling a diverse range of data sets together in their native form, including video, audio, text, spatial and graphical, to create a big picture view of proceedings. It is not a 'crystal-ball' approach or the work of a good 'forecaster'-it is more about being alert to day-to-day happenings. Popp et al. (2004, p. 36) use the analogy of joining the dots, only it is much more complex than that, given there is no specifically defined problem and very little is known about where to begin searching for the answer. Initially it may be a worthwhile exercise to study previous terrorist attacks and to consider these in light of the possibilities. This does not mean that all terrorist attacks and security breaches are executed in the same manner but it recognizes a benchmark for future attacks. It showcases what is possible, and gives warning that future attacks will grow in sophistication, process and magnitude.
Defense intelligence data that is gathered from different sources needs to be collected and analyzed holistically within a spatial Information Management System (IMS). This can be done using geographic classification as the primary key for creating relational links between database tables. Specific end-user applications can then be built which use a secure Web-based portal to run queries and generate relevant reports. High-level information can be nationwide, with the ability to zoom-in into state, postal code, street and individual dwelling levels with a mixture of satellite, aerial and vector-based data sets. Even though new dwellings are erected every day, land, sea and similar boundaries are for the greater part static. What constitutes Australia and Australian waters for instance will not change overnight. Independent of the data type, geospatial systems can cope with a diverse range of information and act as the hub for comparison and decisionmaking. The reality is though that no single agency owns all the geographic content.
There could be hundreds of suppliers in any given nation. An initiative like the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in the U.S. as a "national intelligence and combat support agency whose mission is to provide timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence" is strongly recommended for any country concerned with national security.
Independent of a united body however, there may still be problems with determining which spatial data set(s) to use. There can be conflicts between data sets that were created in different years and by different organizations. For example, town centers may shift, as may the size of postal codes within them due to processes such as gentrification. Annual spatial links between data sets thus need to be made to ensure that vintage data is not rendered completely useless to the situation at hand today. Making a decision on the government agencies that will be responsible for updating and maintaining each data set is also very important. Most likely, suppliers like the Lands Department in the local area will have accumulated thousands of different data sets since the inception of digitization.
Being able to identify which maps are meaningful is a long and time-consuming exercise but it must be done by a specific taskforce who have the end result in mind. The aim is to build a standardized clearinghouse where defense intelligence personnel with access privileges can acquire this data. The facility may even allow for dynamic updates. A note here is required to state the obvious-that above and beyond the need for standardization of GIS, it is critical that the adversary does not gain access to defensive GIS data. There have already been several cases argued in the United States that show enemies of the nation to be acquiring and using map data from public web sites for intelligence purposes. Terrorists too can utilize hi-tech to their advantage.
While defense intelligence is usually considered a multifaceted multipart problem due to the great number of unknowns, there are some general rules that apply. Foremost, defense
intelligence is more about making use of valid information-one can act on 'fact' but can only consider acting on "incomplete, ambiguous and/or unreliable" intelligence (Yen, 2004, p. 34) . And in terms of sureties, the only thing any nation can claim to know, at least to begin with, is its own geographic landscape. Knowing oneself is the beginning of wisdom. The question is how to know another? How can a nation predict terrorist attacks when terrorists continually conceive new ways to inflict terror? As Popp et al. (2004, p. 37) state, "…we are faced with a new world in which change occurs very rapidly, and the enemy is asymmetric and poses a very different challenge; the most significant threat today is foreign terrorists and terrorist networks whose identities and whereabouts we do not always know." Historically, though we can point to contemporary terrorist examples as far back as the 1960s, it has been recently that an escalation in activity has taken place.
In Egypt a series of car bomb blasts targeted numerous luxurious hotels along the Sinai For instance, an individual wishing to cause a major disaster in a location could not act alone. They will use some form(s) of communication-telephone, mail, email or fax.
Being able to trace such information could help authorities identify possible suspects.
Consider being able to trace every location visited by an individual, including homes, businesses, and public space. This information could be used to build not only a geoprofile of the individual but also some sort of psychological assessment. Already caller details records (CDR) are used to help police and federal authorities to catch criminals.
Beyond CDRs, the mobile phone itself could be used to present typical routes taken by the individual. Things being sent by individuals, like mail or parcels, could also be tagged using RFID. Sender information is still optional in many countries but knowing where the package came from is important. Given the ability to back-track on historical exchanges between suspected terrorists, it could help to decrease situations like the U.S. Anthrax scares.
There are different ways that CoI could work, and this in itself is a project for further research. CoI could be implemented by using an anticipatory approach or, as has been presented in this hypothetical scenario, it may be implemented in real-time. Among the prospective social models to implement such a system are (in order of invasiveness):
i) one global 'follow-me' number is allocated to individuals at birth;
ii) all citizens are required to carry/wear a permanent mobile tracking device; and iii) all citizens are implanted with a RFID transponder.
It is also possible to understand the social models as complementary to one another, evolving over time. Determining an accurate CoI matrix, requires the identification of at least two or more fixed geographic locations, as either originating or terminating nodes.
CoI in the scenario given here would work with 'mobile' nodes, that is, tracking actual human beings as they go about their daily tasks. Knowing where a person has been does not necessarily make them a suspect, but given a series of circumstances they could be considered for deeper surveillance. There are already well-instituted person-number systems in the majority of nations, although these techniques are not entirely useful given the majority were created at a point when computing power was relatively primitive. In many instances, duplicate citizen numbers are creating grave problems for government data-matching programs. An alternate proposal is a universal ID (UID) at birth. This ID could be used for a plethora of applications, from an individual's telephone number or email address, to their fixed home address, dispelling the problem of inter-country movements and intra-country location. The main argument for a UID is that it will eliminate the problem of false identities. The UID would have a wide-ranging use.
Yasuura (2003) has put forward the idea of a Personal Identifier (PID) system for bidirectional authentication and an RFID tag system for a "new social infrastructure".
The "digitally named world" would require members of society to be identified by a PID/UID and for all goods and products to be identified by RFID. It would even be possible to know when an individual has entered a particular building or when they have purchased particular materials. The view of pervasive computing thus becomes "a world of omnipresent but invisible information technology embedded into products and everyday items" (Siegemund & Flörkemeier, 2003, p. 378) . From here it is a small advance for users to interact with objects using mobile phones. The querying could happen via SMS and active tags could thereafter process the commands sent to the object.
Apart from the RFID UID, a GPS wrist-worn device would also identify an individual's exact whereabouts. As Werb (p. 52) speculated in 1999, "[i]n the not-to-distant future… GPS devices will become so small and affordable that monitoring and tracking of humans in real-time would be feasible." The question that needs to be asked is why a strategy such as this should be instituted when it is such a small percentage of the world's population that is causing breaches in security.
For now the approach seems highly unlikely, but in the event of terrorist strikes increasing in frequency and magnitude to include such things as 'limited' nuclear strikes causing global unrest, it is possible that the approach could be adopted by governments responding to and recovering from an emergency." Contingency planning, which focuses on the "prevention of undesirable events and the mitigation of undesirable consequences," comes before emergency preparedness (Wang, 2004, p. 22 ). Laxminarayan and Kun (2004, p. 27) Apart from outdoor monitoring, indoor monitoring may also be applied. Context-aware building environments with surveillance beyond video cameras will become commonplace. Communication in these in-building settings could occur between "smart objects, between smart objects and background infrastructure services, and between smart objects and their users" (Siegemund & Flörkemeier, 2003, p. 379) . Wireless LANs could be used to monitor UIDs. Anyone who should not be in the building would be detected.
As the tags would be invisible to users, there would be an implicit association between their actions and the system. Whether the user agreed or not, an unobtrusive sensor could be triggered without their knowledge. This would be advantageous in the event of a breach in security but obviously unethical in any other circumstance.
People involved in response efforts would be more educated about unfolding situations if positioning technologies were used. Improved access could be given to, for example, building layouts, floor plans and stairways, location of gas lines, water lines and air ducts.
During the 9/11 recovery and response, firefighters were not given the adequate information they needed and as a result many lost their lives trying to put out a fire that was beyond control. The response was conducted in a state of panic, rather than being led the area of concern after dispersion analysis or other required analyses had been determined. Civilians could be messaged about the effects of a biological attack, using their UID, either to an email or mobile handset through SMS (beyond that of media reports via broadcasts). Positioning technologies could also be used to precisely identify the location of debris to help with the reconstruction of what took place, and assist with clearing and rebuilding efforts. Cordoned off areas that were out-of-bounds for civilians could be identified on maps messaged to individuals affected by the disaster. In addition to this, information could be collected straight from field workers and sent via the appropriate applications to a secure government database, given the appropriate Webbased portals for communication. Participants in a pilot for mobility and emergency services, post 9/11, were found to be "hopeful about the roles that mobile devices and wireless access can play in making their work life safer and also better enable them to perform their duties" (Sawyer et al., 2004, p. 64) . The major advantage of wireless computing that the pilot reaffirmed was in the speed that information flowed from person-to-person, and from person-to-system using existing processes at critical times. It is also important to highlight that participants were more concerned with reliable connectivity than upload and download speeds. Taggart et al. (2003) have written extensively about the significance of satellite systems in emergency management. They describe that irrespective of how rapidly fixed and mobile operators get networks back in operation after a major disruption, that during terrorist attacks it is satellites that should be relied upon as an alternative system for communications. "The difficulty of many of the first responders… to communicate with themselves and to other federal agencies confirmed the need for an interoperable and flexible communication infrastructure… Since many of these agencies must make timecritical decisions, there may not be enough time for communication links to be restored using conventional mobile ground or airborne nodes" (Taggart et al., 2003 (Taggart et al., , p. 1155 . In the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, it was privately-owned satellites that provided communications when landline and terrestrial networks failed. Some examples include the Iridium and Globalstar providers. Quite possibly first responders in the future will be equipped with GPS universal phones to allow for coordination, management and integration in the response effort. While Taggart et al. predict that only the key personnel will most likely be equipped with GPS phones due to the fact that first responders are already heavily equipped with other tools, the devices will likely be wearable (especially as the GPS chipsets get smaller). In addition to person-to-person communications and person-to-system communications, system-to-system communications could also take place. In the event of a radioactive, chemical or biologically exposed area, sensor data could automatically be collected and sent to laboratories for more detailed analysis.
According to Want (2004, p. 86) , detectors could minimize the danger of "long-term exposure to such harmful agents, many of which are invisible and odorless. In addition, deploying such devices at national ports of entry could help identify potential terrorist activity before it occurs." Saydjari (2004, p. 56 ) is correct in his summation that "[w]e need a spectrum of system models and an engineering framework analogous to the CAD/CAM framework used by hardware engineers. The community needs adequate threat models, adversary models, mission models, and countermeasure effectiveness models. Each type of model will require tremendous energy to produce, yet little effort is under way in these arenas." Assuming these models are created and implemented, their are pushing advancement in directions that are totally incomparable to historical military and homeland security developments. Indeed, in the current information age, we are seeing an unprecedented development and dispersion of technology. This new investment however, despite its potential for success, is not necessarily the way to curb all future security breaches. Warranted as the effort may be, especially in terms of pure peacekeeping efforts, arguing that this set of advancements are better or more advantageous than previous developments simply because they are 'different' or more widely accepted is erroneous. The odds of total success are still low and are marred by the fact that no system can ever be foolproof. press releases and formal statements of apology, the U.S. government admitted that the bombing was both an error and an accident. The positioning technology had functioned correctly but the knowledge systems supporting it had failed. Official accounts pointed to three major intelligence faults. First, the technique used to locate the FDSP building was imprecise. The geographic co-ordinates of the building were produced using inexact land navigation techniques to pinpoint a street address on out-of-date maps. Second, the databases used to correlate and cross correlate the location of the target and its surroundings housed incomplete and dirty data. With regard to the Chinese Embassy in particular, multiple databases within the U.S. Department of Defense showed it still to be in its pre-1996 location, even despite several visits to the new building by U.S. officials after 1996. Accordingly, the Embassy was never identified as being in the target location, and the FDSP building was never shown to be anywhere else. The third major intelligence flaw involved the focus of the attack. Pre-attack reviews had centered upon how to attack, the value of the target, and the possibility of collateral damage. The accuracy of the location was never questioned. The culmination of these events was that the bombing went ahead in error. U.S. officials had become complacent with the use of knowledge management systems and this was reflected in the way the positioning technology was applied.
Before we can really use the technology in its most beneficial capacity, we need to master the art of information intelligence. If the use of positioning technology is to be accepted, it needs to be employed using legitimate inputs. Indeed, though its use may be valid for homeland security purposes, it is not valid to use the technology improperly or to cause damage outside the immediate need for action, whether or not this action is protective. To create a positive process for use, a change in the culture surrounding information gathering and knowledge systems may be required. Indeed, when considering the issue of timeliness needed for knowledge gathering in the Information Age, Kun (2004, p. 35) writes, "[w]e need to change our methods, our systems, our infrastructures, our procedures, and our policies." Where this change is not incited, the impact and acceptance of positioning technology may be lessened. That there are gray areas and potentially unacceptable uses for it though does not convincingly indicate that we are concentrating on the wrong initiative. To ensure maximum benefit however, technology cannot be the only initiative on which progress in homeland security depends. The potential for human error in the operation of positioning technologies and the management of their associated knowledge systems means that the creation of checks, balances and support systems must become a vital part of the defense infrastructure. Not only this, but alternate and distinct initiatives in areas such as peacekeeping and economic controls (to name but two global areas for concern) must also share a critical focus. By creating this multi-faceted defense system then, some level of dynamism in security strategy is assured as varying options for action and reaction are available. This becomes paramount as, faced with nebulous enemies, "static preventative techniques, while important, are inadequate" (Saydjari, 2004, p. 54) .
FUTURE TRENDS
The use of positioning technology as a means of automatic and location-based identification is set to increase exponentially. In line with the size of increase however, the rate of increase will depend greatly upon general agreements as to application quality and standards. For positioning technologies, especially those in dual public and private use, an assessment of application quality is often dependent upon commercial or application readiness. As such, applications being researched present different concerns to those products being sold in the marketplace. Further, technologies that utilise humans as major elements (not simply as participants) in the overall system create additional issues. Take In the early 1990s however, the potential cost efficiencies and performance improvements that the combination of the two systems might bring was identified. In May 1994, a convergence plan was submitted to the U.S.
Congress and, four years later, was endorsed by the President. The result, in 1998, was the National Polar Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), a polarorbiting environmental satellite system that capitalized on NASA's Earth Observing System to satisfy both civil and military requirements. Since that time it has successfully managed the command and control functions of both programs, and has arguably done so at a reduced cost. Convergence in terms of homeland security does have some disadvantages however. By integrating multiple systems into a singular entity it compounds the number of operational facets that are susceptible to a breach in security.
Further, where lines of demarcation are not clearly drawn between each system component, questions as to the involvement of non-defense agencies in homeland security may be raised. These considerations mean that the future effects of using homeland security systems for defense, or of them being targeted in a security breach, are amplified in comparison to current states. The use of hybrid knowledge systems widens the scope for social damage. The willingness to converge systems to gain economic and technological economies of scale must be tempered by a visible delineation of ownership and responsibility, and must be managed by appropriate implementation and recovery strategies if the future visions for convergence and heightened knowledge systems are to be successful ones. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether changes to current arrangements will actually take place, especially in the short term.
In supporting convergence and enhanced knowledge systems, we face a battle with bureaucracy as information sharing channels are still not currently suited to the free flow of information between government and law enforcement agencies. In the area of homeland security specifically, information sharing channels were dealt a serious blow and toward increasing and improving forensic capabilities toward cyber-crime.
Three years on however, investigations show that the long-term repercussions of the PATRIOT Act were, perhaps, not adequately considered and that the Act may indeed violate individual rights of citizens. The grim reality is that in order to improve homeland security, new powers were given to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, both domestic and international, at the cost of eliminating the controls that previously existed to ensure that courts had authority to regulate the abuse of such powers. proposals from those based on convenience and illusion, and yet avoid the appearance of ingratitude or cynicism toward those who might just be doing their best to help?"
It is impossible to tell whether the current lack of comprehension and unity in response to homeland security initiatives is a sign of things getting worse before they get better, or whether it simply shows that each new terrorist action will place greater restraints on freedom. What can be predicted with certainty is that the positioning technologies used to support defense and associated bureaucratic efforts will continue to advance. How they are implemented will be a product of the efficiencies that we are seeking to create at present. Thus, the structures that we are only now starting to build will reflect in the use of positioning technologies and their underlying knowledge systems. An absence of longterm studies makes the evolutionary path difficult to predict in this respect and can only be further complicated by any attempt to prejudge the ethics that will inevitably become a part of all future security actions. The result is that though we can predict an application of technology, we cannot predict its effect or outcome.
CONCLUSION
There is no simple or singular solution to the current security crisis and with the increasing complexities of global advancement caution must be taken when formulating a response. Both cause and effect of action must be assessed. Here, let us compare two very different but equally devastating events. On the 26 th of April 1986, a nuclear accident and fire damaged a power plant in Chernobyl. For days afterwards, a giant cloud of radiation hovered over much of Europe and today the consequences are still being felt through infertile land and human deformity. In citing an article by Reuters, Kun (2004, p. 42) writes that it took until 1990 for the Soviet authorities to realize the extent of the accident. After evacuating 100,000 people within a 20 mile zone a few days after the disaster, authorities evacuated another 14,000 at the end of 1990, for a sum total of 90,000 people in the years after the actual event had occurred. Though the damage was catastrophic and widespread, the global response was limited. Initiatives to make nuclear power and associated facilities safer received little attention and those who were not directly affected by the accident were able to ignore its occurrence without ramifications.
In contrast, on September 11, 2001, two passenger jets flew into the Twin Towers in New York City. Though killing thousands, the geographic damage was confined to Manhattan.
Emotionally however, the whole world was affected. Governments leapt into action and a new Age of Terror was declared. Why then, in two such catastrophic disasters, did the response differ so widely? Arguably, the vital difference between the two situations, and the factor that caused such different reactions, was the element of intention. Where the disaster at Chernobyl was not the result of hostility, 9/11 was a political statement designed to invoke fear. As a result, the global response was rapid. Keeping in mind that terrorist attacks were not new to the world however, why was the response as large and as information base from which to derive useful inputs, the positioning technology is rendered useless or, in a worst-case scenario, can create situations far more damaging than those ever imagined. This is because though it is easy to speculate over the path of advancement, the outcomes of adoption are never as simple to predict.
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